

Long Essay Questions : Moral Psychology

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0.1. Instructions

Choose any one question. Do not attempt to answer more than one question in your essay.

0.2. Using sources

Do not cite sources that are not referenced in the lecture notes already. Unless you have an excellent reason for doing so, which you must state in the essay.

Always give page numbers.

Examiners on this course frequently comment ‘your essay could have been improved by focussing on fewer high-quality sources and covering them in more depth.’

0.3. Lecture Materials

Each question draws on specific sections of the lecture material, which also provide sources. Your essay should demonstrate knowledge of evidence, arguments and theories from the lecture material relevant to the thesis you aim to establish.

Examiners on this course frequently comment ‘your essay could have been improved by making better use of the lecture material.’

0.4. Glossary

Use the glossary. The lecture materials include a glossary to facilitate communication between us. You may deviate from the glossary providing you explicate your terms and providing you have good reason for doing so.

0.5. Advice

The questions below are written with a view to allowing a wide range of good answers, including some your examiners may not have foreseen. Your essay should answer the question chosen but it need not provide a complete answer. The best essays are often tightly focussed on one aspect of the question. This is fine: just be sure to explain the part of the question you are addressing and demonstrate that you are aware of what else would be needed to fully answer the question.

0.6. Structure

Open your essay by stating the thesis you will defend.

If necessary (ideally not), explain how the thesis is relevant to your chosen question.

The rest of your essay should provide a single coherent line of argument for your thesis and nothing else.

0.7. Difficulty Level

Some questions permit answers that are relatively straightforward to establish. In general, you should not limit yourself to establishing a straightforward answer if aiming for a high mark.

0.8. Support for Planning

One of the seminars for this course will provide you with an opportunity to discuss your plans.

0.9. Marking Criteria

This course uses the standard philosophy marking criteria. Ideally your essay will demonstrate an awareness of a philosophical issue in behavioural sciences. We are aware that students taking this course may come from a variety of disciplines. Your essay can be written in the style of an essay from any of the disciplines covered on this course.

0.10. Citation Style

Use exactly one of the following citation styles: APA, Harvard or Chicago.

0.11. Word Count

Everything counts towards the word limit.

Acronyms, abbreviations and contractions count as the corresponding number of full words. For example, TLA counts as three words. (Hint: do not invent acronyms. Your readers are miserable enough already.)

There are many ways to count words. Your essay must be under the word limit according to any way of counting words. Your examiners' ways of counting words may not match your own, so leave a margin.

Examiners will stop reading if they hit the word limit.

0.12. Bespoke Questions

You may devise your own question through discussion with s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk. Your question must then be submitted using a form on the Philosophy web pages and formally approved.

Do not answer a question not on this list without written approval.

1. Given that human actions are consequences of two (or more) dissociable processes, namely habitual and goal-directed processes, what (if any) are the consequences for philosophical theories of action?

1.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

1.2. Hints

Check the glossary entries on The Problem of Action, habitual process, , , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

1.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 01*
- *Lecture 02*
- *Lecture 03*
- *Lecture 09*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Goal-Directed and Habitual Processes* in Lecture 01
- *The Minor Puzzle about Habitual Processes* in Lecture 02
- *There Are No Habitual Actions* in Lecture 02
- *Philosophical Theories of Action* in Lecture 01
- *Solution to the Problem of Action* in Lecture 09
- *The Problem of Action meets Habitual Processes* in Lecture 02

1.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Dickinson (2016)
- Frankfurt (1978)
- Davidson (1971)
- Schwabe & Wolf (2010)

1.5. Further Reading

- Bach (1978)
- Dickinson & Pérez (2018)
- Kalis & Ometto (2021)
- Wood & Rüniger (2016)
- Neal et al. (2011)
- Frankfurt (1978)

1.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

2. Given that human actions are consequences of two (or more) dissociable processes, namely habitual and goal-directed processes, what (if any) are the consequences for decision theory?

2.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

2.2. Hints

Focus on a single application of decision theory in your answer. (And be sure you understand what ‘application’ means in this context.)

Check the glossary entry on decision theory, habitual process , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

2.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 01*
- *Lecture 03*
- *Lecture 08*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Dual Process Theory Opposes Decision Theory?* in Lecture 03
- *Goal-Directed and Habitual Processes* in Lecture 01
- *Preference vs Aversion: A Dissociation* in Lecture 08
- *What Are Preferences?* in Lecture 03

2.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Dickinson (2016)
- Jeffrey (1983)

2.5. Further Reading

- Dickinson & Pérez (2018)
- Balleine (1992)
- Davidson (1974)

2.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

3. How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of action incorporate scientific discoveries about the control of action?

3.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

3.2. Hints

Check the glossary entry on The Problem of Action, motor representation, , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

3.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 02*
- *Lecture 07*
- *Lecture 08*
- *Lecture 09*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Motor Representation* in Lecture 07
- *Motor Representation and The Problem of Action* in Lecture 07
- *Motor Representations Aren't Intentions* in Lecture 07
- *Motor Representations Ground the Directedness of Actions to Goals* in Lecture 07
- *Philosophical Theories of Action* in Lecture 01
- *Solution to the Problem of Action* in Lecture 09
- *The Interface Problem: Motor Representation vs Intention* in Lecture 08

- *The Problem of Action meets Habitual Processes* in Lecture 02

3.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Davidson (1971)
- Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2019)
- Bach (1978)
- Jeannerod (2006)
- Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2016)

3.5. Further Reading

- Pacherie (2008)
- Rosenbaum (2009)
- Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2014)
- Pacherie (2006)
- Shepherd (2021)
- Christensen (2021)
- Ferretti & Zipoli Caiani (2021)

3.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

4. Could some motor representations be intentions?

4.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

4.2. Hints

Check the glossary entry on motor representation, , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

4.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 07*
- *Lecture 08*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Motor Representation* in Lecture 07
- *Introduction* in Lecture 07
- *Motor Representations Aren't Intentions* in Lecture 07
- *Motor Representations Ground the Directedness of Actions to Goals* in Lecture 07
- *The Interface Problem: Motor Representation vs Intention* in Lecture 08

4.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Brozzo (2017)
- Pacherie (2006)

- Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2019)

4.5. Further Reading

- Pacherie (2018)
- Haggard (2005)
- Hornsby (2000)
- Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2016)
- Bratman (1987)

4.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

5. What is an interface problem? Consider one case in which an interface problem arises. How could the problem be solved?

5.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

5.2. Hints

Check the glossary entries on interface problem, , , match, , , , and apraxia.

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

5.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lecture contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 08*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Conclusion* in Lecture 08
- *Interface Problems and the Role of Experience* in Lecture 08
- *Introduction* in Lecture 08
- *Preference vs Aversion: A Dissociation* in Lecture 08
- *The Interface Problem: Motor Representation vs Intention* in Lecture 08

5.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2014)
- Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2016)

5.5. Further Reading

- Jackendoff (1996)
- Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2019)
- Shepherd (2019)
- Burnston (2017)
- Balleine & Dickinson (1998)

5.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

6. What distinguishes joint actions from individual actions performed in parallel?

6.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

6.2. Hints

Check the glossary entry on joint action, The Problem of Joint Action, , , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

6.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 04*
- *Lecture 06*
- *Lecture 09*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *The Autonomy Dilemma (Objection to Pacherie)* in Lecture 06
- *Collective Goals* in Lecture 09
- *Could Motor Representations Ground Collective Goals?* in Lecture 09
- *Pacherie's Objection to Bratman on Shared Intention* in Lecture 06
- *Bratman on Shared Intentional Action* in Lecture 04
- *Quick Answers Fail* in Lecture 04
- *Salomone-Sehr's Minimalist Account of Joint Action* in Lecture 04
- *The Problem of Joint Action* in Lecture 04

6.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Bratman (2014)
- Gilbert (1990)
- Pacherie (2013)
- Salomone-Sehr (2024)

6.5. Further Reading

- Bratman (2022)
- Gilbert (2013)
- Gilbert (2010)
- Blomberg (2016)

6.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

7. What, if anything, do scientific discoveries about the interpersonal coordination of action reveal about how joint action differs from acting in parallel but merely individually?

7.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

7.2. Hints

Check the glossary entries on joint action, The Problem of Joint Action, , , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

7.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 04*
- *Lecture 09*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Collective Goals* in Lecture 09
- *Could Motor Representations Ground Collective Goals?* in Lecture 09
- *Bratman on Shared Intentional Action* in Lecture 04
- *Quick Answers Fail* in Lecture 04
- *The Problem of Joint Action* in Lecture 04
- *Task Co-Representation* in Lecture 09

7.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming

to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Sinigaglia & Butterfill (2022)
- Knoblich et al. (2011)
- Butterfill (2017)

7.5. Further Reading

- Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2023)

7.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

8. Is there a counterexample to Bratman's theory of shared agency?

8.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

8.2. Hints

Be sure you understand what a counterexample is. Check the glossary entry on counterexample.

Petersson (2007, p. 140) attempts to provide a counterexample ('Suppose I want the window smashed. ...')

Be sure you understand what Bratman's theory of shared agency claims.

This is a difficult question as no one has yet succeeded in publishing a counterexample to Bratman's theory of shared agency.

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

Other useful glossary entries are: - - - -

8.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 04*
- *Lecture 06*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Pacherie's Objection to Bratman on Shared Intention* in Lecture 06
- *Bratman on Shared Intentional Action* in Lecture 04
- *From Team Reasoning to Shared Intention* in Lecture 06

8.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming

to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Bratman (2014)
- Pacherie (2013)
- Petersson (2007)
- Salomone-Sehr (2024)

8.5. Further Reading

- Gold & Sugden (2007)
- Tollefsen (2005)
- Paulus (2016)

8.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

9. What is team reasoning? Why, if at all, must an account of joint action invoke team reasoning?

9.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

9.2. Hints

Check the glossary entries on team reasoning, joint action, , , , and .

Please also follow the general instructions for *Long Essay Questions*.

9.3. Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 05*
- *Lecture 06*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Aggregate Subjects* in Lecture 06
- *The Autonomy Dilemma (Objection to Pacherie)* in Lecture 06
- *Applications and Limits of Game Theory* in Lecture 05
- *What Is Team Reasoning?* in Lecture 05
- *From Team Reasoning to Shared Intention* in Lecture 06

9.4. Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

- Sugden (2000)
- Pacherie (2013)
- Bratman (2011)

9.5. Further Reading

- Gold & Sugden (2007)
- Bratman (2014)
- Hindriks (2012)
- Bacharach (2006)

9.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

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