Goal-Directed and Habitual Processes
This section introduces a key distinction between goal-directed and habitual processes.
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Notes
In Instrumental Action, we asked about the relation between an instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed. As we saw, the Standard Answer given by philosophers is that intention grounds this relation.
But are there maybe things other than intentions which might link an instrumental action to an outcome?
A Clue from Animal Learning
According to Dickinson (2016, p. 177):
‘instrumental behavior is controlled by two dissociable processes: a goal-directed and an habitual process’
He goes on to specify what the ‘goal-directed process’ involves:
‘an action is goal-directed if it is mediated by the interaction of a representation of the causal relationship between the action and outcome and a representation of the current incentive value, or utility, of the outcome in a way that rationalizes the action as instrumental for attaining the goal’ Dickinson (2016, p. 177).
Dickinson’s ‘goal-directed process’ corresponds to the belief--desire model we just considered. The ‘representation of the causal relationship between the action and outcome’ could be a belief about which action will bring an outcome about (e.g. the belief that if I pour, I will fill Zak’s glass). And the ‘representation of the current incentive value, or utility, of the outcome’ could be a desire.
| philosophy | animal learning | decision theory |
|---|---|---|
| belief | representation of the causal relationship between the action and outcome | subjective probability |
| desire | representation of the current incentive value, or utility, of the outcome | preference |
Table: rough correspondence between terms used for modelling action across three disciplines.
So when Dickinson says that instrumental actions are ‘controlled by two dissociable processes’, he is implying that the Standard Answer about belief, desire and intention cannot fully explain the relation between an instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed. If he is right, we also have to consider something he calls ‘an habitual process’.
What Are Habitual Processes?
Habitual processes involve connections between stimuli and actions. For example, the presence of an empty glass (a stimulus) may be connected to the action of pouring. These connections are characterised by two features:
When the action is performed in the presence of the simulus, the connection between action and stimulus is strengthened (or ‘reinforced’) if the action is rewarded.
If the connection is strong enough, the presence of the stimulus will cause the action to occur.
This is another way of stating Thorndyke’s Law of Effect:
‘The presentation of an effective [=rewarding] outcome following an action [...] reinforces a connection between the stimuli present when the action is performed and the action itself so that subsequent presentations of these stimuli elicit the [...] action as a response’ (Dickinson, 1994, p. 48).
How do habitual processes differ from those involving belief, desire and intention? Two differences are important for our purposes:
The effects of habitual processes do not depend on what you currently desire. This is because the strength of the stimulus–action connection depends only on what was rewarding for you in the past, not what is rewarding for you now.
The effects of habitual processes do not depend on what you currently believe about which outcome the action will have. This is because the strength of the stimulus–action connection depends only on what outcomes the action had in the past, not on which outcomes it will have now.
Because habitual processes have these features, we can be sure that they are genuinely distinct from processes involving belief, desire and intention.
Habitual Processes and Instrumental Action
Our Main Question is, What is the relation between an instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed? This question can be answered by invoking habitual processes. For if an action is due to an habitual process, then there is a stimulus–action connection which caused it. This stimulus–action connection must have been strengthened in the past because, often enough, some (one or more) rewarding outcomes occurred when the action was performed in the presence of the stimulus. But since habitual processes exist to enable the agent repeatedly bring about such rewarding outcomes, it follows that the action occurs now in order to bring about these (one or more) rewarding outcomes. That is, the action is directed to the outcome; it is an instrumental action.
The Standard Answer therefore fails to provide a full answer to the Main Question about instrumental action. To fully answer it we need not only belief, desire and intention but, minimally, also the kind of stimulus–action connections involved in habitual processes.
So What?
After this section, you should understand what an instrumental action is, you should understand the Main Question, and you should understand how habitual processes and goal-directed processes differ.
The next step is to investigate possible consequences for philosophical theories of action.
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Glossary
You may encounter variations on this definition of instrumental in the literature. For instance, Dickinson (2016, p. 177) characterises instrumental actions differently: in place of the teleological ‘in order to bring about an outcome’, he stipulates that an instrumental action is one that is ‘controlled by the contingency between’ the action and an outcome. And de Wit & Dickinson (2009, p. 464) stipulate that ‘instrumental actions are learned’.