Question 2: Given that human actions are consequences of two (or more) dissociable processes, namely habitual and goal-directed processes, what (if any) are the consequences for decision theory?
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Focus on a single application of decision theory in your answer. (And be sure you understand what 'application' means in this context.)
Check the glossary entry on decision theory, habitual process
goal-directed process, dual-process theory of instrumental action, and
primary motivational state.
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Glossary
decision theory :
I use ‘decision theory’ for the theory elaborated by Jeffrey (1983). Variants are variously called ‘expected utility theory’ (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004), ‘revealed preference theory’ (Sen, 1973) and ‘the theory of rational choice’ (Sugden, 1991). As the differences between variants are not important for our purposes, the term can be used for any of core formal parts of the standard approaches based on Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1972).
dual-process theory of instrumental action :
Instrumental action ‘is controlled by two dissociable processes: a
goal-directed and an habitual process’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 177).
(See instrumental action.)
goal-directed process :
A process which involves ‘a
representation of the causal relationship between the action and outcome
and a representation of the current incentive value, or utility, of the
outcome’ and which influences an action ‘in a way that rationalizes
the action as instrumental for attaining the goal’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 177).
habitual process :
A process underpinning some instrumental actions which obeys
Thorndike’s Law of Effect:
‘The presentation of an effective [=rewarding] outcome following an action [...] reinforces
a connection between the stimuli present when the action is performed and the action itself
so that subsequent presentations of these stimuli elicit the [...] action as a response’
(Dickinson, 1994, p. 48).
(Interesting complication which you can safely ignore: there is probably much more to say about
under what conditions the stimulus–action connection is strengthened; e.g. Thrailkill, Trask, Vidal, Alcalá, & Bouton, 2018.)
primary motivational state :
A state such as hunger, thirst, satiety, aversion or sexual arousal.
Primary motivational states are closely linked to biological needs.
They are not all acquired through learning; and learning has limited
effects on them, although classical conditioning can modify them
(Capaldi, Hunter, & Lyn, 1997).
References
Balleine, B. (1992). Instrumental performance following a shift in primary motivation depends on incentive learning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,
18, 236–250.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.18.3.236Capaldi, E. D., Hunter, M. J., & Lyn, S. A. (1997). Conditioning with taste as the CS in conditioned flavor preference learning.
Animal Learning & Behavior,
25(4), 427–436.
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03209849Davidson, D. (1974). Belief and the basis of meaning. In
Inquiries into truth and interpretation (pp. 141–154). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dickinson, A. (1994). Instrumental conditioning. In N. Mackintosh (Ed.),
Animal learning and cognition. London: Academic Press.
Dickinson, A. (2016). Instrumental conditioning revisited: Updating dual-process theory. In J. B. Trobalon & V. D. Chamizo (Eds.),
Associative learning and cognition (Vol. 51, pp. 177–195). Edicions Universitat Barcelona.
Dickinson, A., & Pérez, O. D. (2018). Actions and Habits: Psychological Issues in Dual-System Theory. In R. Morris, A. Bornstein, & A. Shenhav (Eds.),
Goal-Directed Decision Making (pp. 1–25). Academic Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812098-9.00001-2Hargreaves-Heap, S., & Varoufakis, Y. (2004).
Game theory: A critical text. London: Routledge. Retrieved from
http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2587142~S1Jeffrey, R. C. (1983).
The logic of decision, second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ramsey, F. (1931). Truth and probability. In R. Braithwaite (Ed.),
The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. London: Routledge.
Savage, L. J. (1972).
The foundations of statistics (2nd rev. ed). New York: Dover Publications.
Sen, A. (1973). Behaviour and the Concept of Preference.
Economica,
40(159), 241–259.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2552796Sugden, R. (1991). Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy.
The Economic Journal,
101(407), 751–785.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2233854Thrailkill, E. A., Trask, S., Vidal, P., Alcalá, J. A., & Bouton, M. E. (2018). Stimulus control of actions and habits: A role for reinforcer predictability and attention in the development of habitual behavior.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition,
44, 370–384.
https://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000188