Question 2: Given that human actions are consequences of two (or more) dissociable processes, namely habitual and goal-directed processes, what (if any) are the consequences for decision theory?

Hints

Focus on a single application of decision theory in your answer. (And be sure you understand what 'application' means in this context.)

Check the glossary entry on decision theory, habitual process and goal-directed process.

Please also follow the general instructions for Long Essay Questions.

Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

Dual Process Theory Opposes Decision Theory?

Goal-Directed and Habitual Processes

What Are Preferences?

Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

Dickinson (2016)

Jeffrey (1983)

Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading.

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

Glossary

decision theory : I use ‘decision theory’ for the theory elaborated by Jeffrey (1983). Variants are variously called ‘expected utility theory’ (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004), ‘revealed preference theory’ (Sen, 1973) and ‘the theory of rational choice’ (Sugden, 1991). As the differences between variants are not important for our purposes, the term can be used for any of core formal parts of the standard approaches based on Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1972).

goal-directed process : A process which involves ‘a representation of the causal relationship between the action and outcome and a representation of the current incentive value, or utility, of the outcome’ and which influences an action ‘in a way that rationalizes the action as instrumental for attaining the goal’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 177).

habitual process : A process underpinning some instrumental actions which obeys Thorndike’s Law of Effect: ‘The presentation of an effective [=rewarding] outcome following an action [...] reinforces a connection between the stimuli present when the action is performed and the action itself so that subsequent presentations of these stimuli elicit the [...] action as a response’ (Dickinson, 1994, p. 48). (Interesting complication which you can safely ignore: there is probably much more to say about under what conditions the stimulus–action connection is strengthened; e.g. Thrailkill, Trask, Vidal, Alcalá, & Bouton, 2018.)

References

Dickinson, A. (1994). Instrumental conditioning. In N. Mackintosh (Ed.), Animal learning and cognition. London: Academic Press.

Dickinson, A. (2016). Instrumental conditioning revisited: Updating dual-process theory. In J. B. Trobalon & V. D. Chamizo (Eds.), Associative learning and cognition (Vol. 51, pp. 177–195). Edicions Universitat Barcelona.

Dickinson, A., & Pérez, O. D. (2018). Actions and Habits: Psychological Issues in Dual-System Theory. In R. Morris, A. Bornstein, & A. Shenhav (Eds.), Goal-Directed Decision Making (pp. 1–25). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812098-9.00001-2

Hargreaves-Heap, S., & Varoufakis, Y. (2004). Game theory: A critical text. London: Routledge. Retrieved from http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2587142~S1

Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The logic of decision, second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ramsey, F. (1931). Truth and probability. In R. Braithwaite (Ed.), The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. London: Routledge.

Savage, L. J. (1972). The foundations of statistics (2nd rev. ed). New York: Dover Publications.

Sen, A. (1973). Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. Economica, 40(159), 241–259. https://doi.org/10.2307/2552796

Sugden, R. (1991). Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy. The Economic Journal, 101(407), 751–785. https://doi.org/10.2307/2233854

Thrailkill, E. A., Trask, S., Vidal, P., Alcalá, J. A., & Bouton, M. E. (2018). Stimulus control of actions and habits: A role for reinforcer predictability and attention in the development of habitual behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, 44, 370–384. https://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000188