Glossary
Glossary
action slip : ‘A slip is a form of human error defined to be the performance of an action that was
not what was intended’ (Norman, 1981, p. 1). Examples include
saying canpakes for pancakes or pouring coffee on to cereal.
agent-neutral : A representation or plan is agent-neutral if its content does not
specify any particular agent or agents; a planning process is agent-neutral
if it involves only agent-neutral representations.
agglomeration : The norm of agglomeration says it is a mistake to knowingly have several intentions if it
would be a mistake to knowingly have one large intention agglomerating the several intentions; see
Bratman (1987) or Setiya (2014, p. §4).
aggregate subject : A subject whose proper parts are themselves subjects. A paradigm example would be a Portuguese man o' war (Physalia physalis), which is an animal that can swim and eat and whose swimming and eating is not simply a matter of the swimming or eating of its constituent animals. Distinct from, but sometimes confused with, a plural subject.
anchor : A theory, fact or other thing that is used by a group of researchers to ensure
that they have a shared understanding of a phenomenon.
An anchor is needed when it is unclear whether different researchers are offering
incompatible claims about a single phenomenon or compatible claims about distinct phenomena.
For example, we might take decision theory
to anchor a shared understanding of belief and desire.
Causal Theory of Action : According to this view, an event is action ‘just in case it has a certain sort of
psychological cause’ (Bach, 1978, p. 361).
classical conditioning : Also called ‘Pavlovian conditioning’. A stimulus—stimulus link is
learned through explosure to contingencies, causing you to respond to
the first stimulus as if the second were present. Pavlov famously
conditioned a dog to salivate on hearing a bell by having the bell
sound before food arrived. Subject to effects like blocking and
overshadowing.
CNV : Contingent negative variation, an EEG component. In the experimental designs of interest to us, the CNV serves as a signal of motor preparation for action which is time-locked to action onset. Although identified well over half a century ago, exactly what the CNV signals in different contexts remains a topic of investigation (Kononowicz & Penney, 2016).
co-representation : Two or more individuals co-represent something if they each individually represent it
and their representations are of the same kind (for example, they are both motor representations).
Co-representation is not metarepresentation: instead of representing another’s representation,
co-representation involves representing the thing represented.
collective goal : an outcome to which two or more agents’ actions are directed where this is not, or not only, a matter of each action being directed to that outcome (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2022).
computational description : A computational description of a system or ability specifies what the thing is for and how it achieves this.
Marr (1982) distinguishes the computational description of a system from representations and algorithms and its hardware implementation.
connection condition : ‘the condition that specifies the nature of [the] explanatory relation’ between
shared intention and joint action ... [T]he basic idea is that what is central to the connection condition is that
each is responsive to the intentions and actions of the other in ways that track
the intended end of the joint action--where all this is out in the open’ (Bratman, 2014, pp. 78--9).
contrast case : a pair of cases where one involves shared agency
and the other does not and which are otherwise as similar as possible.
decision theory : I use ‘decision theory’ for the theory elaborated by Jeffrey (1983). Variants are variously called ‘expected utility theory’ (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004), ‘revealed preference theory’ (Sen, 1973) and ‘the theory of rational choice’ (Sugden, 1991). As the differences between variants are not important for our purposes, the term can be used for any of core formal parts of the standard approaches based on Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1972).
devaluation : To devalue some food (or video clip, or any other thing) is to reduce its value,
for example by allowing the agent to satiete themselves on it or
by causing them
to associate it with an uncomfortable event such as an electric shock or mild illness.
directed : For an action to be directed to an outcome is for the action to happen in order to bring that outcome about.
directedness : (of an action to an outcome) Where an action happens in
order to bring about an outcome, the action is thereby directed to that outcome.
(See also instrumental action.)
dominance : An action (or strategy) strictly dominates another if it ensures better outcomes for its player no matter what other players choose. (See also weak dominance.)
dual-process theory : Any theory concerning abilities in a particular domain on which those
abilities involve two or more processes which are distinct in this sense:
the conditions which influence whether one mindreading process occurs differ
from the conditions which influence whether another occurs.
dual-process theory of instrumental action : Instrumental action ‘is controlled by two dissociable processes: a
goal-directed and an habitual process’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 177).
(See instrumental action.)
EEG : Electroencephalography, the measurement of electrical activity on your scalp to make inferences about neural activity. Compared to fMRI, EEG has high temporal resolution but low spatial resoltion, and imposes less restrictions on movement during measurement. Involves wearing a cap studded with electrodes.
ethically neutral condition : ‘A condition is ethically neutral in relation to a particular agent and a particular consequence if the agent is indifferent between having that consequence when the condition holds and when it fails’ (Jeffrey, 1983, p. 46).
extinction : In some experiments, there is a phase (usually following
instrumental training and an intervention such as devaluation) during
which the subject encounters the training scenario exactly as it was
(same stimuli, same action possibilities) but the actions produce no
revant outcomes. In this extinction phase, there is no reward (nor punishment).
(It is called ‘extinction’ because in many cases
not rewarding (or punishing) the actions
will eventually extinguish the stimulus--action links.)
fMRI : Functional magnetic resonance imaging, the detection of minute changes in magnetisation to infer how much blood is flowing to different parts of the brain, and so how active the neurons in different parts of the brain are. Compared to EEG, fMRI has low temporal resolution but high spatial resoltion, and imposes greater restrictions on movement during measurement. Involves being stuck in an expensive scanner, usually in a hospital.
forward model : A model used to predict ‘the sensory consequences of a motor command’ (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003, p. 595). In action performance,
forward models are used to compensate for feedback delays,
to distinguish self-produced movements and their sensory consequences, and to
select between different courses of action.
game theory : This term is used for any version of the theory based on the ideas of Neumann, Morgenstern, Rubinstein, & Kuhn (1953) and presented in any of the standard textbooks including. Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis (2004); Osborne & Rubinstein (1994); Tadelis (2013); Rasmusen (2007).
goal-directed process : A process which involves ‘a
representation of the causal relationship between the action and outcome
and a representation of the current incentive value, or utility, of the
outcome’ and which influences an action ‘in a way that rationalizes
the action as instrumental for attaining the goal’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 177).
goal-state : an intention or other state of an agent which links an action of hers to a
particular goal to which it is directed.
habitual process : A process underpinning some instrumental actions which obeys
Thorndyke’s Law of Effect:
‘The presentation of an effective [=rewarding] outcome following an action [...] reinforces
a connection between the stimuli present when the action is performed and the action itself
so that subsequent presentations of these stimuli elicit the [...] action as a response’
(Dickinson, 1994, p. 48).
(Interesting complication which you can safely ignore: there is probably much more to say about
under what conditions the stimulus–action connection is strengthened; e.g. Thrailkill, Trask, Vidal, Alcalá, & Bouton, 2018.)
inferential integration : For states to be inferentially integrated means that: (a) they can come to be nonaccidentally
related in ways that are approximately rational thanks to processes of inference and practical reasoning;
and
(b) in the absence of obstacles such as time pressure, distraction, motivations to be
irrational, self-deception or exhaustion, approximately rational harmony will
characteristically emerge, eventually, among those states.
instrumental action : An action is instrumental if it happens in
order to bring about an outcome,
as when you press a lever in order to obtain food. (In this case,
obtaining food is the outcome, lever pressing is the action, and the
action is instrumental because it occurs in order to bring it about
that you obtain food.)
You may encounter variations on this definition of instrumental in the literature. For instance, Dickinson (2016, p. 177) characterises instrumental actions differently: in place of the teleological ‘in order to bring about an outcome’, he stipulates that an instrumental action is one that is ‘controlled by the contingency between’ the action and an outcome. And de Wit & Dickinson (2009, p. 464) stipulate that ‘instrumental actions are learned’.
You may encounter variations on this definition of instrumental in the literature. For instance, Dickinson (2016, p. 177) characterises instrumental actions differently: in place of the teleological ‘in order to bring about an outcome’, he stipulates that an instrumental action is one that is ‘controlled by the contingency between’ the action and an outcome. And de Wit & Dickinson (2009, p. 464) stipulate that ‘instrumental actions are learned’.
interagential planning : Our planning is interagential just if you and I are each planning actions that I will eventually perform and actions that you will eventually perform, where the resulting plans non-accidentally match. Contrast interconnected planning.
interconnected planning : Our plans are interconnected just if facts about your plans feature in mine and conversely. Contrast interagential planning.
interface problem : An interface problem may arise when two kinds of representation sometimes non-accidentally
match: the problem is to explain how such matches are possible.
joint action : Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others.
Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman, 1992),
lifting a heavy sofa together (Velleman, 1997),
preparing a hollandaise sauce together (Searle, 1990),
going to Chicago together (Kutz, 2000),
and walking together (Gilbert, 1990).
These examples are supposed to be paradigm cases of a class of phenomena we shall call ‘joint actions’.
Researchers have used a variety of labels including ‘joint action’ (Brooks, 1981; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; Tollefsen, 2005; Pettit & Schweikard, 2006; Carpenter, 2009; Pacherie, 2010; Brownell, 2011; Sacheli, Arcangeli, & Paulesu, 2018; Meyer, Wel, & Hunnius, 2013), ‘social action’ (Tuomela & Miller, 1985), ‘collective action’ (Searle, 1990; Gilbert, 2010), ‘joint activity’ (Baier, 1997), ‘acting together’ (Tuomela, 2000), ‘shared intentional activity’ (Bratman, 1997), ‘plural action’ (Schmid, 2008), ‘joint agency’ (Pacherie, 2013), ‘small scale shared agency’ (Bratman, 2014), ‘intentional joint action’ (Blomberg, 2016), ‘collective intentional behavior’ (Ludwig, 2016), and ‘collective activity’ (Longworth, 2019).
We leave open whether these are all labels for a single phenomenon or whether different researchers are targeting different things. As we use ‘joint action’, the term applies to everything any of these labels applies to.
Researchers have used a variety of labels including ‘joint action’ (Brooks, 1981; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; Tollefsen, 2005; Pettit & Schweikard, 2006; Carpenter, 2009; Pacherie, 2010; Brownell, 2011; Sacheli, Arcangeli, & Paulesu, 2018; Meyer, Wel, & Hunnius, 2013), ‘social action’ (Tuomela & Miller, 1985), ‘collective action’ (Searle, 1990; Gilbert, 2010), ‘joint activity’ (Baier, 1997), ‘acting together’ (Tuomela, 2000), ‘shared intentional activity’ (Bratman, 1997), ‘plural action’ (Schmid, 2008), ‘joint agency’ (Pacherie, 2013), ‘small scale shared agency’ (Bratman, 2014), ‘intentional joint action’ (Blomberg, 2016), ‘collective intentional behavior’ (Ludwig, 2016), and ‘collective activity’ (Longworth, 2019).
We leave open whether these are all labels for a single phenomenon or whether different researchers are targeting different things. As we use ‘joint action’, the term applies to everything any of these labels applies to.
limit of a theory : either (i) a true proposition (or class of propositions) which cannot be derived from the theory and which falls within the domain the theory is supposed to illuminate; or (ii) a false proposition (or class of propositions) which can be derived from the theory.
match : [of outcomes] Two collections of outcomes, A and B, match in a particular context just if,
in that context, either the occurrence of the A-outcomes would normally
constitute or cause, at least partially, the occurrence of the B-outcomes or
vice versa.
To illustrate, one way of matching is for the B-outcomes to be the A-outcomes. Another way of matching is for the B-outcomes to stand to the A-outcomes as elements of a more detailed plan stand to those of a less detailed one.
[of plan-like structures] In the simplest case, plan-like hierarchies of motor representations match if they are identical. More generally, plan-like hierarchies match if the differences between them do not matter in the following sense. For a plan-like hierarchy in an agent, let the self part be those motor representations concerning the agent's own actions and let the other part be the other motor representations. First consider what would happen if, for a particular agent, the other part of her plan-like hierarchy were as nearly identical to the self part (or parts) of the other's plan-like hierarchy (or others' plan-like hierarchies) as psychologically possible. Would the agent's self part be different? If not, let us say that any differences between her plan-like hierarchy and the other's (or others') are not relevant for her. Finally, if for some agents' plan-like hierarchies of motor representations the differences between them are not relevant for any of the agents, then let us say that the differences do not matter.
[of motivational states] Two motivational states match in a particular context just if, in that context, the actions one would cause and the actions the other would cause are all proper ways of fulfilling both motivational states.
To illustrate, one way of matching is for the B-outcomes to be the A-outcomes. Another way of matching is for the B-outcomes to stand to the A-outcomes as elements of a more detailed plan stand to those of a less detailed one.
[of plan-like structures] In the simplest case, plan-like hierarchies of motor representations match if they are identical. More generally, plan-like hierarchies match if the differences between them do not matter in the following sense. For a plan-like hierarchy in an agent, let the self part be those motor representations concerning the agent's own actions and let the other part be the other motor representations. First consider what would happen if, for a particular agent, the other part of her plan-like hierarchy were as nearly identical to the self part (or parts) of the other's plan-like hierarchy (or others' plan-like hierarchies) as psychologically possible. Would the agent's self part be different? If not, let us say that any differences between her plan-like hierarchy and the other's (or others') are not relevant for her. Finally, if for some agents' plan-like hierarchies of motor representations the differences between them are not relevant for any of the agents, then let us say that the differences do not matter.
[of motivational states] Two motivational states match in a particular context just if, in that context, the actions one would cause and the actions the other would cause are all proper ways of fulfilling both motivational states.
mechanistically neutral : A characterisation of instrumental action (or of joint action)
is mechanistically neutral just if it does not involve
making commitments concerning which states,
or structures of states, cause instrumental actions (or cause joint actions).
meshing subplans : ‘The sub-plans of the participants mesh when it is possible that all of these
sub-plans taken to gether be successfully executed.’
(Bratman, 2014, p. 53)
model based : A model-based process is one that relies on a model. This is usually thought
to involve deriving predictions from representations of the model.
Compare Dayan & Berridge (2014, p. 477): ‘A model-based strategy involves prospective
cognition, formulating and
pursuing explicit possible future scenarios based on internal representations
of stimuli, situations, and environmental circumstances.’
model free : A model-free process is one that does not rely on a model. This term is often
used for processes which exploit causal or statistical connections that are not represented.
modest sociality : ‘small scale shared intentional agency
in the absence of
asymmetric authority relations’ (Bratman, 2009, p. 150).
motor planning : The ‘process by which the ... outputs of the [motor] system are specified given an extrinsic task goal.’
(Wolpert, 1997, p. 210)
motor representation : The kind of representation characteristically involved in preparing, performing and monitoring sequences of small-scale actions such as grasping, transporting and placing an object.
They represent actual, possible, imagined or observed actions and their effects.
nash equilibrium : ‘a list of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can get a better payoff by switching to some other strategy that is available to her while all the other players adhere to the strategies specified for them in the list’ (Dixit, Skeath, & Reiley, 2014, p. 95).
Nash equilibrium : a profile of actions (sometimes called a ‘strategy’) from which no agent can unilaterally profitably deviate.
noncooperative game : ‘Games in which joint-action agreements are enforceable are called cooperative games; those in which such enforcement is not possible, and individual participants must be allowed to act in their own interests, are called noncooperative games’ (Dixit et al., 2014, p. 26).
operant conditioning : Also called ‘instrumental conditioning’.
A stimulus—action link is learned through your action being rewarded
when it occurs with the stimulus.
Own Action Condition : ‘it is always true that the subject of an intention is the intended agent of the intended activity’ (Bratman, 2014, p. 13).
parallel planning : Our planning is parallel just if you and I are each planning actions that I will eventually perform and actions that you will eventually perform, where the resulting plans non-accidentally match. Contrast interconnected planning.
planning-like : A process is planning-like if has features characteristic of planning.
For instance, it may start with representations of relatively distal outcomes and gradually
fill in details, resulting in representations whose contents can be
hierarchically arranged by the means--end relation
(compare Grafton & Hamilton, 2007 on motor processes).
Or a process may be planning-like in that it involves meeting
constraints on the selection of means by which to bring about one outcome that
arise from the need to select means by which, later, to bring about another
outcome (Rosenbaum, Chapman, Weigelt, Weiss, & Wel, 2012).
plural subject : Some subjects who are collectively the subject of an intention or other attitude. If there is one token intention that is both my intention and your intention and no one else’s intention, then we are the plural subject of that intention. (The intention is therefore shared in the same sense that, if we were siblings, we would share a parent.) Distinct from, but sometimes confused with, an aggregate subject.
practical reasoning : ‘The mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted
is at a distance from the immediate action, and the
immediate action is calculated as a way of getting or doing or
securing the thing wanted’ (Anscombe, 1957, p. 79).
See also Millgram (2001, p. 1):
‘Practical reasoning is reasoning directed towards action:
figuring out what to do, as contrasted with figuring
out how the facts stand.’
primary motivational state : A state such as hunger, thirst, satiety, aversion or sexual arousal.
Primary motivational states are closely linked to biological needs.
They are not all acquired through learning; and learning has limited
effects on them, although classical conditioning can modify them
(Capaldi, Hunter, & Lyn, 1997).
primary reason : A primary reason is a belief–desire pair identifying which amounts giving the reason why an agent did something (Davidson, 1980, p. 4).
primitive action : Primitive actions are ‘ones we do not by doing something else' (Davidson, 1971, p. 59).
(This notion has been clarified and refined by Hornsby (1980) and others, but
the refinements are unlikely to matter for our purposes.)
representational format : Format is an aspect of representation distinct from content (and from vehicle). Consider that
a line on a map and a list of verbal instructions can both represent the same route through a city.
They differ in format: one is cartographic, the other linguistic.
representations and algorithms : To specify the representations and algorithms involved in a system is to specify how the inputs and outputs are represented and how the transformation from input to output is accomplished.
Marr (1982) distinguishes the {representations and algorithms} from the computational description of a system and its hardware implementation.
Settle Condition : ‘intentions . . . are the attitudes that resolve deliberative questions, thereby settling issues’ (Velleman, 1997, p. 32).
shared intention : An attitude that stands to joint action as ordinary, individual intention stands to
ordinary, individual action.
It is hard to find consensus on what shared intention is, but most agree
that it is neither shared nor intention.
(Variously called ‘collective’, ‘we-’ and ‘joint’ intention.)
Simple Theory of Joint Action : Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are appropriately related to their actions.
(This view is introduced and considered in Butterfill (2016);
it is a very minor view whose purpose is motivate considering other views.)
Standard Solution : (to The Problem of Action). Actions are those events which
stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.
stimulus : A stiumlus is just a situation or event. Typically, ‘stimlus’ is used to label
things which do, or might, prompt actions such as the presence of a lever or the
flashing of a light.
strict dominance : In game theory, one action strictly dominates another action if the first action guarantees its player higher payoffs than the second action regardless of what other players choose to do. (See Definition 59.2 in Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994, p. 59 for a more general definition.)
task representation : A task representation links a representation of an event,
such as the timer’s ringing, and a motor representation that specifies an action,
such as taking the stew out of the oven, in such a way that if the event occurs,
the subject becomes disposed to prepare and perform the action represented.
(These are perhaps the same as the stimulus–action links involved in
habitual processes.)
team reasoning : ‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it’ (Bacharach, 2006, p. 121).
The Problem of Action : What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you?
(According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action
is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)
The Problem of Joint Action : What distinguishes doing something jointly with another person from acting in
parallel with them but merely side by side?
very small scale action : An action that is typically distantly related as a descendent by the
means-ends relation to the actions which are sometimes described as
‘small scale’ actions, such as playing a sonata, cooking a meal or
painting a house (e.g. Bratman, 2014, p. 8; Gilbert, 1990, p. 178).
weak dominance : In game theory, one action weakly dominates another action if the first action guarantees its player payoffs at least as good as the other action and potentially better than it regardless of what other players choose to do. (Contrast strict dominance.)
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