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Question 3: How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of action incorporate scientific discoveries about the control of action?

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Check the glossary entry on The Problem of Action, motor representation.

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Lecture Notes

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Reading

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Further Reading

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Glossary

motor representation : The kind of representation characteristically involved in preparing, performing and monitoring sequences of small-scale actions such as grasping, transporting and placing an object. They represent actual, possible, imagined or observed actions and their effects.
The Problem of Action : What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)

References

Bach, K. (1978). A representational theory of action. Philosophical Studies, 34(4), 361–379. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703
Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2014). Intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 119–145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.
Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2019). Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(2), e1481. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1481
Pacherie, E. (2006). Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions. In S. Pockett, W. P. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (p. 0). The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0009
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. Cognition, 107(1), 179–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2009). Human motor control (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press.