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Question 3: How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of action incorporate scientific discoveries about the control of action?

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Check the glossary entry on The Problem of Action, motor representation, Standard Solution, habitual process, interface problem, and representational format.

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Reading

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Glossary

habitual process : A process underpinning some instrumental actions which obeys Thorndike’s Law of Effect: ‘The presenta­tion of an effective [=rewarding] outcome following an action [...] rein­forces a connection between the stimuli present when the action is per­formed and the action itself so that subsequent presentations of these stimuli elicit the [...] action as a response’ (Dickinson, 1994, p. 48). (Interesting complication which you can safely ignore: there is probably much more to say about under what conditions the stimulus–action connection is strengthened; e.g. Thrailkill, Trask, Vidal, Alcalá, & Bouton, 2018.)
interface problem : An interface problem may arise when two kinds of representation sometimes non-accidentally match: the problem is to explain how such matches are possible.
motor representation : The kind of representation characteristically involved in preparing, performing and monitoring sequences of small-scale actions such as grasping, transporting and placing an object. They represent actual, possible, imagined or observed actions and their effects.
representational format : Format is an aspect of representation distinct from content (and from vehicle). Consider that a line on a map and a list of verbal instructions can both represent the same route through a city. They differ in format: one is cartographic, the other linguistic.
Standard Solution : (to The Problem of Action). Actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.
The Problem of Action : What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)

References

Bach, K. (1978). A representational theory of action. Philosophical Studies, 34(4), 361–379. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703
Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2014). Intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 119–145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x
Christensen, W. (2021). The Skill of Translating Thought into Action: Framing The Problem. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12(3), 547–573. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00517-2
Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, & A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, action, and reason, (pp. 3–25). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.001.0001
Dickinson, A. (1994). Instrumental conditioning. In N. Mackintosh (Ed.), Animal learning and cognition. London: Academic Press.
Ferretti, G., & Zipoli Caiani, S. (2021). How Knowing-That and Knowing-How Interface in Action: The Intelligence of Motor Representations. Erkenntnis, 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00395-9
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.
Jeannerod, M. (2006). Motor cognition: What actions tell the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2016). Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8, 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0311-6
Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2019). Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(2), e1481. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1481
Pacherie, E. (2006). Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions. In S. Pockett, W. P. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (p. 0). The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0009
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. Cognition, 107(1), 179–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2009). Human motor control (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press.
Shepherd, J. (2021). The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge. The Shape of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thrailkill, E. A., Trask, S., Vidal, P., Alcalá, J. A., & Bouton, M. E. (2018). Stimulus control of actions and habits: A role for reinforcer predictability and attention in the development of habitual behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, 44, 370–384. https://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000188