Question 4: Could some motor representations be intentions?
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Check the glossary entry on motor representation,
representational format,
inferential integration, and
Standard Solution.
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Glossary
inferential integration :
For states to be inferentially integrated means that: (a) they can come to be nonaccidentally
related in ways that are approximately rational thanks to processes of inference and practical reasoning;
and
(b) in the absence of obstacles such as time pressure, distraction, motivations to be
irrational, self-deception or exhaustion, approximately rational harmony will
characteristically emerge, eventually, among those states.
motor representation :
The kind of representation characteristically involved in preparing, performing and monitoring sequences of small-scale actions such as grasping, transporting and placing an object.
They represent actual, possible, imagined or observed actions and their effects.
representational format :
Format is an aspect of representation distinct from content (and from vehicle). Consider that
a line on a map and a list of verbal instructions can both represent the same route through a city.
They differ in format: one is cartographic, the other linguistic.
Standard Solution :
(to The Problem of Action). Actions are those events which
stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.
The Problem of Action :
What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you?
(According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action
is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)
References
Bratman, M. E. (1987).
Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brozzo, C. (2017). Motor Intentions: How intentions and motor representations come together.
Mind and Language,
32(2), 231–256.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action.
American Philosophical Quarterly,
15(2), 157–162.
Haggard, P. (2005). Conscious intention and motor cognition.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
9(6), 290–295.
Hornsby, J. (2000). Personal and sub-personal: A defence of dennett’s early distinction.
Philosophical Explorations,
3(1), 6–24.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790008520978Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2016). Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology,
8, 317–336.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0311-6Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2019). Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science,
10(2), e1481.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1481Pacherie, E. (2006). Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions. In S. Pockett, W. P. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.),
Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (p. 0). The MIT Press.
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0009Pacherie, E. (2018). Motor intentionality.
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition, 369–387.