Question 5: What is an interface problem? Consider one case in which an interface problem arises. How could the problem be solved?
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Check the glossary entries on interface problem, interface problem, inferential integration, match, motor representation, primary motivational state, action slip, and apraxia.
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Glossary
action slip : ‘A slip is a form of human error defined to be the performance of an action that was
not what was intended’ (Norman, 1981, p. 1). Examples include
saying canpakes for pancakes or pouring coffee on to cereal.
apraxia : a higher order motor disorder
‘observed in patients who, in spite of having no problem in executing
simple actions (e.g. grasping an object), fail in actions involving more
complex, and perhaps more conceptual, representations’
(Jeannerod, 2006, p. 12).
inferential integration : For states to be inferentially integrated means that: (a) they can come to be nonaccidentally
related in ways that are approximately rational thanks to processes of inference and practical reasoning;
and
(b) in the absence of obstacles such as time pressure, distraction, motivations to be
irrational, self-deception or exhaustion, approximately rational harmony will
characteristically emerge, eventually, among those states.
interface problem : An interface problem may arise when two kinds of representation sometimes non-accidentally
match: the problem is to explain how such matches are possible.
match : [of outcomes] Two collections of outcomes, A and B, match in a particular context just if,
in that context, either the occurrence of the A-outcomes would normally
constitute or cause, at least partially, the occurrence of the B-outcomes or
vice versa.
To illustrate, one way of matching is for the B-outcomes to be the A-outcomes. Another way of matching is for the B-outcomes to stand to the A-outcomes as elements of a more detailed plan stand to those of a less detailed one.
[of plan-like structures] In the simplest case, plan-like hierarchies of motor representations match if they are identical. More generally, plan-like hierarchies match if the differences between them do not matter in the following sense. For a plan-like hierarchy in an agent, let the self part be those motor representations concerning the agent's own actions and let the other part be the other motor representations. First consider what would happen if, for a particular agent, the other part of her plan-like hierarchy were as nearly identical to the self part (or parts) of the other's plan-like hierarchy (or others' plan-like hierarchies) as psychologically possible. Would the agent's self part be different? If not, let us say that any differences between her plan-like hierarchy and the other's (or others') are not relevant for her. Finally, if for some agents' plan-like hierarchies of motor representations the differences between them are not relevant for any of the agents, then let us say that the differences do not matter.
[of motivational states] Two motivational states match in a particular context just if, in that context, the actions one would cause and the actions the other would cause are all proper ways of fulfilling both motivational states.
To illustrate, one way of matching is for the B-outcomes to be the A-outcomes. Another way of matching is for the B-outcomes to stand to the A-outcomes as elements of a more detailed plan stand to those of a less detailed one.
[of plan-like structures] In the simplest case, plan-like hierarchies of motor representations match if they are identical. More generally, plan-like hierarchies match if the differences between them do not matter in the following sense. For a plan-like hierarchy in an agent, let the self part be those motor representations concerning the agent's own actions and let the other part be the other motor representations. First consider what would happen if, for a particular agent, the other part of her plan-like hierarchy were as nearly identical to the self part (or parts) of the other's plan-like hierarchy (or others' plan-like hierarchies) as psychologically possible. Would the agent's self part be different? If not, let us say that any differences between her plan-like hierarchy and the other's (or others') are not relevant for her. Finally, if for some agents' plan-like hierarchies of motor representations the differences between them are not relevant for any of the agents, then let us say that the differences do not matter.
[of motivational states] Two motivational states match in a particular context just if, in that context, the actions one would cause and the actions the other would cause are all proper ways of fulfilling both motivational states.
motor representation : The kind of representation characteristically involved in preparing, performing and monitoring sequences of small-scale actions such as grasping, transporting and placing an object.
They represent actual, possible, imagined or observed actions and their effects.
primary motivational state : A state such as hunger, thirst, satiety, aversion or sexual arousal.
Primary motivational states are closely linked to biological needs.
They are not all acquired through learning; and learning has limited
effects on them, although classical conditioning can modify them
(Capaldi, Hunter, & Lyn, 1997).
References
Balleine, B., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Consciousnes - the inferface between affect and cognition. In J. Cornwell (Ed.), Consciousness and human identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burnston, D. C. (2017). Interface problems in the explanation of action. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 242–258. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312504
Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2014). Intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 119–145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x
Capaldi, E. D., Hunter, M. J., & Lyn, S. A. (1997). Conditioning with taste as the CS in conditioned flavor preference learning. Animal Learning & Behavior, 25(4), 427–436. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03209849
Jackendoff, R. (1996). The architecture of the linguistic-spatial interface. In P. Bloom, M. A. Peterson, L. Nadel, & M. F. Garrett (Eds.), Language and space (pp. 1–30). Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.
Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2016). Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8, 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0311-6
Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2019). Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(2), e1481. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1481
Shepherd, J. (2019). Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(2), 286–305. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12433