copy for chat

Seminar 7

Questions

What are the three distinct levels of intention proposed in the dynamic hierarchical model?
What, according to Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2019), is the solution to The Problem of Action?
What is the problem of deviant causal chains and what, according to Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2019), is the solution to it?

Lecture Notes

Reading

Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2019)

Glossary

forward model : A model used to predict ‘the sensory consequences of a motor command’ (Wolpert et al., 2003, p. 595). In action performance, forward models are used to compensate for feedback delays, to distinguish self-produced movements and their sensory consequences, and to select between different courses of action.

inferential integration : For states to be inferentially integrated means that: (a) they can come to be nonaccidentally related in ways that are approximately rational thanks to processes of inference and practical reasoning; and (b) in the absence of obstacles such as time pressure, distraction, motivations to be irrational, self-deception or exhaustion, approximately rational harmony will characteristically emerge, eventually, among those states.

interface problem : An interface problem may arise when two kinds of representation sometimes non-accidentally match: the problem is to explain how such matches are possible.

motor planning : The ‘process by which the ... outputs of the [motor] system are specified given an extrinsic task goal.’ (Wolpert, 1997, p. 210)

representational format : Format is an aspect of representation distinct from content (and from vehicle). Consider that a line on a map and a list of verbal instructions can both represent the same route through a city. They differ in format: one is cartographic, the other linguistic.

Standard Solution : (to The Problem of Action). Actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

The Problem of Action : What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)

References

Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2014). Intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 119–145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x

Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, & A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, action, and reason, (pp. 3–25). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.001.0001

Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.

Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2019). Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(2), e1481. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1481

Rosenbaum, D. A. (2009). Human motor control (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press.

Wolpert, D. M. (1997). Computational approaches to motor control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1(6), 209–216. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(97)01070-X

Wolpert, D. M., Doya, K., & Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 358(1431), 593–602. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3558137

Wolpert, D. M., Ghahramani, Z., & Jordan, M. (1995). An internal model for sensorimotor integration. Science, 269(5232), 1880–1882. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7569931